Manolo Quezon is #TheExplainer Newsletter - Generational Divide
My column this week looked at what one survey said: there are only two generations that have not given FM Jr. majority support. What both of these generations have in common is People Power.
This week's The Long View
The big bonanza? | Inquirer Opinion — opinion.inquirer.net
By: Manuel L. Quezon III - @inquirerdotnet
Philippine Daily Inquirer / 04:40 AM April 20, 2022
An online broker puts it this way: “Muted election cycle boost: PSEi historically positive on election years but may fail to replicate strength of prior cycles given purported lower political spending and negative impact of inflation on consumer demand (especially oil).”
What struck me about this prognosis is that it bucks the conventional wisdom about elections, which is that they provide a predictable uptick in the economy every time they happen. Though hedged—by the use of the word “purported”—because what’s unsaid is that there must surely be just as much, if not more, money sloshing around, but it’s just been diverted to far-less-transparent purposes. Which brings us to a report by Regine Cabato recently published in The Washington Post.
The report of her team dissected the revisionism project of the Marcoses which has been going on, online, for 20 years, embracing Facebook, TikTok, YouTube, and even Wikipedia. It is a well-oiled operation that has evolved from copy-paste comments by anonymous accounts to the cultivation of realistic, convincing profiles complete with names, pictures, and postings about nonpolitical things. According to their research, the estimated salary of a troll network moderator who churns out daily “script” or talking points to defend the client ranges from P40,000-50,000 ($700-800) monthly; on the other hand, “micro-influencers” (those with “only” 10,000 followers) can earn P300,000-350,000 ($5,000+), including bonuses, for a monthly retainer during the election season (one job offer shared by a source was pegged at P25,000-30,000 to manage a Facebook page, with a higher fee for anyone fluent in Ilocano). The article also says that there is a sustained branding effort to project Sandro Marcos as a TikTok heartthrob to secure the political dynasty’s status among Gen Z and others.
Based on Octa’s April 2-6 survey, the payoff for the Marcoses can be measured in the generational harvests among the two youngest cohorts of voters, and the least effect among the oldest cohort of Filipinos who were old enough to actually remember and experience what Marcos’ rule was really like. There is another cohort where Marcos failed to obtain a majority: those 35-44 who are considered a “microgeneration” sometimes called Xennials, born sometime between 1977 and 1983.
Here’s the breakdown according to Octa:
75 years and older (born 1947 or before): 36 percent Marcos, 21 percent Robredo;
65-74 (born 1948-1957): 53 percent Marcos, 26 percent Robredo;
55-64 (born 1958-1967): 54 percent Marcos, 26 percent Robredo;
my cohort 45-54: (1968-1977) 50 percent Marcos, 31 percent Robredo
35-44: (1978-1987) 46 percent Marcos, 26 percent Robredo;
25-34: (1988-1997) 62 percent Marcos, 16 percent Robredo;
and 18-24: (1998-2004) 77 percent Marcos, 8 percent Robredo.
Recall that 58 percent of voters belong to what is considered the “youth” which is defined as those between the ages of 18 and 41 (approximately 37 million voters, while 42-57 total 16.7 million voters; and 58 and above, 11.9 million voters).
We are in the fast and furious closing weeks of the campaign but already, the finger-pointing, at least online, has begun. By which I mean the kinds of comments from generally young politically-minded people who argue basically along these lines: 1) There ought to have been a law banning the Marcoses from returning; 2) Filipinos are too kind-hearted and forgiving. The underlying premise from those making similar comments is a criticism of older generations.
Yet the numbers suggest three things. First, the Marcos restoration, if it happens, will have been made possible fundamentally by the Marcoses winning the hearts and minds of the young, except, it seems, the 35-44 generation that underwent its own people power experience in 2001-06, just as it worked the least among those old enough to have been active in the years of the dictatorship. Second, that for all the other cohorts where Marcos is claimed to enjoy majority support, they are cohorts that have been targeted for two decades online; and one could argue the 30 percent support the Marcoses achieved in 2010-16 only nearly doubled when social media manipulation also evolved by leaps and bounds. Third, that it took decades, colossal funding, and unexpected innovations in technology says something about it being an uphill struggle for the Marcoses.
Related readings on voters
My column explored information from the latest Octa April 2-6, 2022 Survey. These slides, in particular, are useful:
For percentages see 56% of May 2022 voters part of the youth – Comelec. Additional useful links includes a map of the Distribution of 65.7M voters in the May 2022 polls and Most vote-rich provinces, cities for the 2022 Philippine elections; see also an April 15 data story, Who is leading the polls? Nat'l trends, geographical breakdown: look, in particular, at their animated chart of the 2021-22 Pulse Asia Survey.
Randy David looks at the surveys and the passion of volunteers on the ground in his recent column, Citizen engagement against the surveys. See also the Washington Post story below:
How the Philippines’ brutal history is being whitewashed for voters - The Washington Post — www.washingtonpost.com
Rewriting history
The Marcoses’ online revisionism project dates back to the 2000s through the family’s presence on Friendster, Flickr and other now defunct websites, researchers found. Key to the messaging is that the family has been unfairly maligned, that President Ferdinand Marcos was not a corrupt kleptocrat but one that brought his country glory, wealth and infrastructure in the course of his two decade reign, playing down the human rights abuses during that period.
The effort to rewrite history ranges from the serious to the absurd. On Wikipedia, members of the Wiki Society of the Philippines — a group of volunteer editors monitoring pages related to the country — find themselves at the forefront of the information battle, routinely scrubbing efforts to change content on the Marcoses’ pages. A key focus over the year has been the words “dictator” and “kleptocrat,” which users have tried to delete dozens of times.
Wikipedia volunteers find themselves sometimes in “edit wars,” going back and forth with Marcos defenders for hours in the hopes of restoring the truth...
Cute, catchy and misleading
...The disinformation has pushed into other fronts, where unlike Wikipedia, citations and proof are not required. YouTube and TikTok follow Facebook as the leading sources of online disinformation, according to fact-checking collective Tsek.ph. Among the most widely spread falsehoods are claims that no arrests were made under Marcos’s martial law, and that no cases were filed against the Marcos family in court.
YouTube is rife with Philippines-linked conspiracies — from claims that French astrologer Nostradamus predicted Marcos Jr.’s presidency to a now widely believed tale that the Marcos family inherited tons of gold, which will be redistributed if they return to power.
On TikTok, with its time limits, content is shorter and punchier in how it glorifies and romanticizes the Marcos family...
Philippine campaign strategist Alan German, who runs Agents International Public Relations, says this platform has been particularly effective with Filipino voters, who choose candidates that will delight and entertain — “the guys who make noise,” he said. “They’re literally dancing and singing their way into our ballot.”
Troll farms and influencers
Multiple studies and reports have detailed how Duterte’s weaponization of social media has helped silence critics amid a bloody drug war and dismal coronavirus pandemic response. The Marcos family now stands to benefit from that model, especially as Duterte’s daughter Sara Duterte-Carpio is running for vice president alongside Marcos Jr. — consolidating their online networks.
Since 2016, troll operations have grown more adept at skirting takedowns for coordinated inauthentic behavior. They no longer do the copy-paste jobs seen from Duterte supporters in the past, German, the campaign strategist, said. Instead, they act like real people, maintaining personalized accounts, sharing photos and videos, and joining groups.
The modern troll network is led by a moderator and runs like a call center, he explained. A moderator alerts their staff — typically composed of 10 people, each of whom can handle dozens of accounts — to the agenda of the day, such as news items to react to or what criticism to stem.
Others lean on micro-influencers or “key opinion leaders,” who have a few thousand followers. They are picked by candidates based on socioeconomic class, age and location, depending on the demographic the political client needs to reach. The market rate is 4 to 6 cents per like, follower or subscriber.
An influencer with 10,000 followers could earn between $5,800 to $6,800 on a monthly retainer during election season, German said — more than 10 times greater than an average teacher salary.
One digital creative shared a job offer sent by an agent for a “political candidate” with The Washington Post on the condition of anonymity, citing the sensitivity of the matter. It entailed running a Facebook page and posting material every day, with messaging “seeded” from the agency.
“You will be coordinating with an associate of mine for brainstorming of plans but the rest relies on your creativity to create content,” the message read. “There will be minimal interface with the client.”
Winning over the next generation
...Researchers say the change in strategy — more authentic content, focused on Gen Z-friendly platforms — isn’t just about avoiding takedowns. It also intentionally speaks to the next generation, solidifying the Marcos family in people’s hearts beyond just Bongbong as the next president. At the heart of the campaign is his eldest son, Ferdinand Alexander, who is running for Congress.
The 27-year-old, nicknamed Sandro, is a rising online star. Whole accounts are dedicated to fan cams of him, with photo and video run through filters and love songs. Some posts lean into fan fiction...
Experts say these posts, however, are not just from ordinary fans but rather “people” working for Sandro’s own family. Some clues to the inauthenticity of the content include the volume and pace at which they’re released, and access to raw material — which include baby photos and seemingly intimate video, like Sandro dancing with his mother.
TikTok users are often teenagers, well removed from the baggage of martial law. The family’s strategists realized its millennial heir had “great potential to be an influencer,” John Nery, a columnist and co-convener at the Consortium on Democracy and Disinformation, said.
The teen heartthrob fits with the Marcoses’ goal of deepening their family’s celebrity status. Pro-Marcos TikToks show the family “having fun, playing up how close they are to each other,” he said, but also show a gilded life that is entirely aspirational for Filipinos.
That life, however, is exactly what Marcos Jr. is promising for his supporters as he will “unite” the Philippines and make it “rise again” — in a conscious echo of so many other authoritarian populists around the world.
The strongman model plays well in a country with rising socioeconomic disparities, argues McCoy, the historian. He and others expect a Marcos victory to be worse for the Philippine economy and further weaken institutions, including the press.
The opinions of experts, however, can be no match for 30 seconds of TikTok, such as in one video viewed more than 50,000 times, where a toddler simply chants “Bring back Marcos!”...
Related readings on revisionism and denialism
Inquirer Briefing: Negotiated Revolutions – Manuel L. Quezon III — www.quezon.ph
{click on the link to see the full Inquirer Briefing infographic that compares and contrasts violent versus peaceful revolutions}
In my column I also briefly mentioned a debate ongoing (online, anyway) which also has a generational aspect to it. That is: a feeling of resentment among some young people against the generation(s) that expelled the Marcoses, for not engaging in either bloodletting (the liquidation of the Marcoses and friends) or a legally-mandated exclusion of the Marcoses from the country and its politics.
In the first place we forget as I pointed out in a recent column (William Saunders: A name that binds) the return of the Marcoses was due to.a condition made by the Swiss government; see: Switzerland: Court Rules on Marcos Assets
Second of all, the decision of Cory Aquino early on approve the going into exile of the Marcoses, was then challenged by them in the Supreme Court. This was the then-famous Marcos v. Manglapus Case of 1989 (read the decision here).
Noteworthy, too, are instances when Ill-Gotten Wealth Recognized by the Philippine Supreme Court. (see also: Do the Marcoses have ill-gotten wealth?). The previous institution of a national holiday on February 25, and the building of a national monument commemorating the EDSA Revolution, are also tangible expressions that not even President Duterte, with his agenda of accommodating the wishes of the Marcoses for a state burial, was able to reverse.
The sentiments that have led to a debate, on the other hand, makes approach of historian Timothy Garton Ash, who described the People Power revolts in Eastern Europe as "Velvet Revolutions" highly useful. Ash believes what is crucial, considering the peaceful and negotiated nature of "Velvet Revolution," is a Truth Commission and the establishing of the rule of law right away.
Here, legislation matters. There is Republic Act No. 10368, the Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013 which categorically states:
Consistent with the foregoing, it is hereby declared the policy of the State to recognize the heroism and sacrifices of all Filipinos who were victims of summary execution, torture, enforced or involuntary disappearance and other gross human rights violations committed during the regime of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos covering the period from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986 and restore the victims’ honor and dignity. The State hereby acknowledges its moral and legal obligation to recognize and/or provide reparation to said victims and/or their families for the deaths, injuries, sufferings, deprivations and damages they suffered under the Marcos regime.
Similarly, it is the obligation of the State to acknowledge the sufferings and damages inflicted upon persons whose properties or businesses were forcibly taken over, sequestered or used, or those whose professions were damaged and/or impaired, or those whose freedom of movement was restricted, and/or such other victims of the violations of the Bill of Rights.
A very relevant article is this study, Holocaust denial in criminal law: Legal frameworks in selected EU Member States which reminds us that denialism is a fairly recent phenomenon, and that it took years for the societies confronting denialism to recognize it and then approach it from a legal point of view.
As for what made conditions ripe for the a Tipping Point to be possible for the Marcoses, please see my presentation below.
Presentation: The Rise and Fall of our Fifth Republic – Manuel L. Quezon III — www.quezon.ph Paano naapektuhan ng EDSA ang pulitika ng Pilipinas at ang mga sumunod na eleksyon? Alamin natin ito sa #UPLBsaHalalan2022 hatid sa atin ng Department of Social Sciences: “Reflections on the post-EDSA Philippine Politics and Electoral Prospects” Feb. 24, 1PM.
#ProyektoPilipino this week
You can find us twice a week, actually. The video discussion which is the main show, and an audio-only podcast which serves as a kind of in-depth follow-through.
We Bulong: Fake news | Episode 11 | Proyekto Pilipino — www.youtube.com
“Maraming kumikita sa fake news at maraming nabubudol sa kasinungalingan ng mga pulitiko.”
Technology has undoubtedly made it easy—and profitable—to spread fake news, rumors, and outright disinformation. And more than just earn millions, purveyors of fake news are now able to sow distrust in mainstream media and even rig an election to their advantage. In these times where it’s so easy to fall into the trap of black propaganda, where should we turn to and what should we do so we are better armed to discern and judge the legitimacy of the information we receive?
Join Fr. Tito Caluag and his friendly trio of distinguished thinkers—Dr. Leloy Claudio, Manolo Quezon, and Carlo Santiago—as they talk to Prof. Danilo Arao and Prof. Ipe Salvosa, from election watchdogs Kontra Daya and Tsek.ph. These fact-checking collaboratives are doing their best to promote a “kultura ng resibo” where we ask for evidence and we ourselves are ready to present the proof.
Talas ng patalastas - Proyekto Pilipino: Conversations on Civics and Politics | Podcast on Spotify — open.spotify.com Listen to this episode from Proyekto Pilipino: Conversations on Civics and Politics on Spotify. According to Pulse Asia, as of September 2021, 91% of Filipinos get their information from TV, 49% from radio, and 48% from the internet. The pandemic has changed the way we consume information, changing the way advertisement and information is delivered to us. But as social creatures, we are inclined to follow where social events and interactions are happening—and in this day and age, it’s on Facebook. Join Fr. Tito Caluag and his friendly trio of distinguished thinkers—Dr. Leloy Claudio, Manolo Quezon, and Carlo Santiago—to understand how advertising and PR is influencing our choices and votes this coming election. To watch the full version of this conversation with Emily Abrera, a veteran PR practitioner and president of the Foundation for Communication Initiatives, head to the Conscience Collective Youtube Channel here: https://youtu.be/1Bkc06cWGuw ***DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed by the podcast creators, hosts, and guests do not necessarily reflect the official policy and position of Podcast Network Asia. Any content provided by the people on the podcast are of their own opinion, and are not intended to malign any religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual, or anyone or anything. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.